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 2 
Introduction 
 
 In this project, I offer an analysis of originalism in constitutional interpretation. I 
employ the example of the Second Amendment to demonstrate that when there has been 
a systematic cultural shift, as there has between civic republicanism of the founding era 
to the liberal individualism, which began in the Jacksonian America of the early 19th 
century, it is no longer possible to make a compelling originalist argument.1 
 Originalism is an umbrella term to describe the wide range of interpretive theories 
that regard “the discoverable meaning of the Constitution at the time of its initial 
adoption as authoritative for purposes of constitutional interpretation in the present” 
(Whittington 2004, 599). It gained credence as a mode of constitutional interpretation 
beginning in the 1970s, as a reaction to the decisions of the Burger and Warren courts. 
Critics of these courts maintained that Burger and Warren liberally interpreted the 
constitution, and “had effectively been making, rather than interpreting, the law, an act 
inconsistent with the judicial role in a democracy” (Smith 2011, 711).  
Second Amendment discourse, both in the academy and in mainstream societal 
space, has been traditionally dominated by this originalist mode of constitutional 
interpretation. I will elaborate on the specific modes of originalism that have emerged 
and are crucial in the context of the Second Amendment following the landmark Supreme 
Court case, District of Columbia v. Heller (Nelson 2003, Greene 2009, Cornell & 
Kozuskanich 2013). In essence, both proponents and opponents of gun control will 
appeal to this early American historical context in order to justify their respective beliefs. 
                                                        
1 For the purposes of this paper, I will use the term ‘Founding Era’ in a general sense to 
describe the time period between the 1760s and the 1790s. 
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The mainstream debate in the secondary literature generally separates two camps of 
understanding the Second Amendment – the individual rights, and the collective rights 
ideologies. The former claims that the Amendment guarantees constitutional protection 
for individuals to own arms, while the latter holds that the purpose of the amendment was 
for states to prevent the federal disarmament of militias, and thus its protection cannot be 
extended to individuals. I will chronicle relevant early American history, describing 
important events and ideas that reigned paramount in shaping the Second Amendment. 
During the founding era, historical examination demonstrates that the militia was 
intimately linked to notions of civic duty, humanism, and republicanism (Wood 1969, 
Crell 1984, Cornell 2006). I will also address the classical influences on the founders, 
giving a historical grounding to these notions of civic republicanism (Richard 2008, 
Shalev 2009). Having described this civic republican context, I will endorse Saul 
Cornell’s civic right interpretation, a paradigm separate from both the individual and 
collective right interpretations. Thus, any serious commitment to originalism must embed 
the language of the Second Amendment in the civic republican paradigm in which it was 
originally understood. (Cornell 2004, Cornell 2006, Kozuskanich, 2008).  
The early 19th century saw the American political conscience begin to stray away 
from traditional republican values and virtues, into the individualism of liberal theory. 
This can be seen in the emergence of Jacksonian Democracy, which lifted the role of the 
individual to new heights (Kohl 1989). I argue that today’s political and societal climate 
follows in this liberal individualist tradition, and while we have still retained certain 
elements of our republican past, we are nowhere near as civically committed as the first 
“American” populations.  
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The republican tradition placed primary emphasis on the public sphere, a realm 
for the shared, civic life that was seen as the sphere where humans could achieve their 
highest potentials. As demonstrated below in Table 1, founding-era citizens were 
threatened from both anarchic individuals and the oppressive government. The “public 
sphere” to which the Second Amendment was dissolved in the post-Jacksonian era, and 
the role of the individual was elevated in its place, thus creating a dualistic clash between 
the individual and state. 
 This departure from the republican paradigm has dire implications for the vast 
spectrum of originalist interpretations of the Second Amendment. How can we expect to 
ascertain any general or concrete original meaning from the Amendment in our liberal, 
individualist society, when it was crafted under clearly a civic republican context? 
Originalism is grounded in an assumption of conceptual continuity, which does not exist 
for the Second Amendment as a result of the shift in societal paradigm.  
 
Cultural Context of the Second Amendment (Table 1) 
 
 
The figure above represents an important (albeit somewhat simplified) conceptual 
scheme that I believe is pivotal in articulating the danger of appealing to originalism in 
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the context of the Second Amendment. There is a common misconception that Founding-
era Americans only feared the tyranny of the English crown, and that fear alone fueled 
the ratification of the Bill of Rights. While they did hold strong fear regarding their 
tyrannical rulers, they equally dreaded the prospect of the lawless, anarchic mob (Cornell 
2006). The militia served the crucial role as the intermediary between these two extremes 
– that is, of the individual and the government. The militia’s role in the Founding Era 
cannot be overstated. It served as a social institution that held parades and galvanized 
voters (among many other things), a rudimentary police force, as well as a form of 
military. The notion of maintaining the public good undergirds all of the Founding-era 
militia’s roles. They held the public sphere paramount, ensuring that citizens would not 
be harmed as a result of any extreme action on the end of neither those lawless 
individualists nor the tyrannical central government.  
But transition out of civic republicanism more or less erased the space of the 
public sphere from American society. Liberal individualism has dissolved the collective 
conscience, and no longer does the Rousseauean notion of the ‘general will’ carry any 
weight; even modern public opinion polls are not so much ‘public’ opinion, but an 
aggregation of multiple individual opinions. The crafters of our Constitution could not 
have possibly foreseen the dissolution of republicanism (and as a result, the public 
sphere), nor could they have predicted the gradual decline in the militia’s role in society. 
I argue that those who maintain an originalist reading of the Amendment to support an 
individual right to bear arms are erroneously conflating modern manifestations of 
individualism with the civic and public connotations of the Amendment. Similarly, those 
who support a collective right interpretation understate the role of arms to early militias 
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(and civic life), as guns were undoubtedly a key component of Founding-era life. They 
permeated innumerable aspects of early American culture, and were certainly present in 
the life of the average 18th-century citizen. Proponents of this reading similarly gloss over 
the existence of a separate public sphere, which provided the context for arms use. 
While those who ratified our Constitution were writing for posterity’s 
interpretation, the Second Amendment is especially unique as it is wedded to its age. 
Originalism seeks to go back to particular historical moments in order to ascertain the 
correct application of Constitutional ideas. But attempting to extract ideas and direction 
from the Founding-era and applying them to modern society produces radical 
disconnectedness, an idea that I will elaborate upon.  
In this project, I will first describe the paradigm within which the Second 
Amendment initially existed. I will analyze the shift from civic republicanism to liberal 
individualism, before describing the history of the Second Amendment and its case law 
over the past two centuries. Following that, I will describe the difficulties of originalist 
interpretation given the paradigm shift, specifically detailing how they affect the majority 
opinion in District of Columbia v. Heller (2008). I ultimately posit that genuine 
commitments to originalism require that we repeal the Second Amendment. I also 
criticize the general discourse for neglecting the crucial connection between paradigm 
shift and constitutional interpretation.   
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Cultural Contexts of the Second Amendment 
As presented in Table 1, the transition from a civic republican to a more liberal 
individualist society facilitated the dissolution of the public realm, and this has vast 
implications for how an originalist ought to consider the Second Amendment. In Part I of 
this section, I will further describe the heavy value that the founders placed on the public 
realm in the Founding Era. Part II briefly describes the transition to a more individualist 
society, beginning in the early 19th century and continuing through the present day. My 
purpose is not to pinpoint the exact cause of this shift, but rather to demonstrate the 
existence of a severe paradigm shift across American history and, eventually, to identify 
the implications for the doctrine of originalism. Part III will detail the early, ratification-
era history of the Second Amendment. Part IV will describe the case history of the 
Second Amendment to the current day, demonstrating how the Amendment’s judicial 
interpretation altered alongside the societal paradigm. 
 
Republican Origins 
 At the core of American political thought lies a debate between the ideologies of 
civic republicanism and liberal individualism. The former preaches the importance of the 
communal good, championing the public good, “prior and independent of individual 
desires and interests” (Mouffe 1992, 71). The good of the collective public is placed at 
the forefront of the citizens’ consciences, and while they maintain private lives, their 
ultimate successes and validations arise from the collective successes. Very generally, 
liberalism refers to an ideology that emphasizes the separateness of individuals’ private-
public lives. This view posits that the government and will of the state dictates the terms 
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of individuals within the public sphere, they may not be able to do so within the private 
sphere. That is exclusively reserved for decisions made by the individual, and thus 
individual liberties are protected. But taken to an extreme, liberalism may be distorted 
into an ideology that promotes selfishness and the attainment of material wealth, and I 
argue that this is the iteration of liberalism of which the founders were fearful. I believe 
that providing some historical context and insight into the roots of republicanism as it 
pertains to our founders will assist in delineating its role when considering modern day 
issues of constitutional interpretation.  
Prior to beginning my description of civic republicanism and its role in early 
American history, I would like to provide the disclaimer that the debate over the 
ideological origins of the United States (i.e., between civic republicanism and liberalism) 
is still hotly contested.2 While I put forth the dominance of civic republicanism, I do not 
mean to wholly dismiss the role of liberal individualism, and doing so would be a 
superficial treatment of history. My main purpose in asserting civic republicanism is 
ascertaining the existence, and subsequent dissolution, of a distinct public sphere.   
Early Americans strove to design a way of life that was antithetical to the tyranny 
of the English, and the adaptation of republicanism may be understood as a direct 
response to such sentiment. In addition to eliminating any monarchy and adding a 
representative means of election, republicanism added a moral element to the political 
and social life of early Americans. Citizens, elected officials, and institutions were 
expected to adhere to a high standard of morality, as they believed only virtuous societies 
                                                        
2 See Alan Gibson (2000) for a brief survey of the existing literature on the liberalism-
republicanism debate.   
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and civilizations thrived. To affirm this commitment to virtue and moral excellence, they 
often turned to stories of antiquity.  
John Dickinson, Governor of Pennsylvania and Delaware, a signatory of the 
Constitution, author the Letters from a Farmer in Pennsylvania, exemplified these 
commitments, as he concluded each letter with a classical quotation from the great Greek 
and Roman historians and poets (Wood 1969, 49). The founders admired the democracy 
of Athens and the Roman republic from an early age, as well-to-do schoolchildren (and 
thus, future statesmen) were well versed in the tales of the classical age splendor and 
triumph (Richard 2008). However, just as they esteemed the successes of these ages, their 
downfalls served as cautionary to the dangers of moral decrepitude. The decline and 
ultimate collapse of the Roman Empire in particular was viewed largely as a result of the 
gradual moral decay, beginning in the imperial period. The decay was seen as the result 
of the decline in Rome’s civic realm and the unfortunate growth of excessive 
individualism, as well as excessive state power. First, Enlightenment-era historians 
specifically identified an excess of individualism and pinpointed the Imperial era of 
Roman history as the beginning of the lavish, materialistic obsessions that caused the 
decline of Rome (Bederman 2008, Richard 2008). No longer did the citizens uphold the 
virtuous, republican ideals that propelled Rome to global domination. Concentrated 
power within the elite, coupled with a selfish citizenry fractured the empire and catalyzed 
its ultimate downfall. Second, excessive imperial, state-centric conquests and aspirations 
were regarded with analogous disdain. And while the Roman Republic certainly 
possessed imperial elements, the Empire was portrayed to have elevated this imperial 
tendency to levels of lust, far from the moral virtue found in the republic. Most of the 
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individuals whom modern scholarship would label as ‘founders’ would have surely been 
educated in these vices of ancient Rome, likely fearing the results of both these 
individualist and statist mentality on the United States. Instead, it would have been 
prudent to invest in the overall success of the new republic by propagating the idea of the 
public good.  
“No phrase except ‘liberty’ was invoked more often by the Revolutionaries than 
‘the public good.’ It expressed the colonists’ deepest hatreds of the old order and their 
most visionary hopes for the new” (Wood 1969, 55). Civic republicanism treasures the 
notion of the public good; in fact, the public good is one of the cornerstones of 
republicanism as an ideology. Consider the etymology of the word republic – it comes 
from the Latin phrase res publica, which loosely translates as ‘public affair.’ While this 
attitude towards the public good was seen as a radical shift from that of the previous 
English monarchy, it was by no means a new concept or ideal. The familiar tales of 
Roman and Greek antiquity boasted strong republican and democratic values that heavily 
emphasized the role of the public domain in the overall societal welfare. Also important 
was the notion of the “general will,” an idea introduced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau in the 
years preceding the American Revolution, which essentially held that the public 
conscience ought to be prioritized over individual needs and goods, i.e., the particular 
will. Rousseau proved to be immensely influential to the framers, as his notion of 
classical republicanism maintained the ideal of a virtuous citizenry setting aside their 
particular wills in favor of what ought to be done for the greater good.  
Though it would be tempting to dismiss the notion of a separate “public” sphere 
as a convenient metaphysical construction for those purporting to identify civic 
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republican origins, an examination of early American history inextricably points to the 
existence of such an entity. Even the most cursory examination of the Constitution’s 
preamble, beginning with “We the People,” indicates an attention to a collective mode of 
consideration. The tripartite dynamic of the founding-era civic republican society – as 
evidenced in Table 1 – is unique as it posits the public as entirely distinct, in between the 
extremes of the individual and the state. This notion of a “public” is much more than just 
an amalgamation of individuals – at least in a classical, founding-era sense, the citizenry 
was understood in a collective rather than an individual context. The structure of early 
American society elevated the role of the public: “As de Tocqueville observed in his 
study of the United States in the 1830s, involvement in public life is seen not as just a 
duty, but as something offering its own personal rewards” (Dahlgren 2006, 269). Any 
excessive emphasis on the individual was deemed to be problematic to the common good 
and similarly, the totalitarian control of the state was seen as clearly oppressive to the 
public.  
When considering the scope of early American political thought, it would be 
misinformed to ignore the impact of classical liberalism on the founders. Federalists such 
as John Adams and Alexander Hamilton especially embraced ideals of the individuality 
of the citizens against the communitarian tendencies of republicanism. Classical 
liberalism is often associated with the protection of individual liberties from the state; in 
this sense, it closely resembles modern day libertarianism. Still, I maintain the dominance 
of civic republicanism over these emerging liberal strands within the Founding-era 
conscience. Having a basic understanding of republicanism as an ideology and its general 
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impact on early political thought, I will now explore the transition, beginning in the early 
19th century, to a more liberal individualist society.  
 
Transition to Liberal Individualism  
 
 In The Republic Reborn: War and the Making of Liberal America, 1790-1820, 
Steven Watts comprehensively details the relationship between republicanism and 
liberalism within the context of early America. He synthesizes a number of causes – for 
example, economic growth and development, geographic movement westward, the rise of 
Protestant Christianity, and nationalist pride following the War of 1812 – in order to 
assert the ideological evolution to liberalism. He points out the presence of “nascent” 
liberal tendencies, subtly visible as early as the mid-18th century: “Enmeshed with the 
social distentions and creeping commercialization of the Revolutionary era, American 
cultural values and attitudes became strained and uncertain by the late 1700s” (Watts 
1987, 9). He asserts the initial dominance of the republican conscience, with its emphasis 
on civic humanism; the economy of household production; and virtue, which he describes 
as “the subordination of private interests to the general good of the commonwealth” 
(Watts 1987, 11). But by 1820, the political and societal landscapes have radically 
altered, “if almost imperceptibly,” and though republican rhetoric continued into the 19th 
century, “contexts and meanings had altered in significant ways” (Watts 1987, 12). 
The half-century following the Revolution ushered in an era of rapid and large-
scale transformation in just about every aspect of society. Lawrence Frederick Kohl 
(1989) succinctly, yet comprehensively, surveys the changes by the time of the 
Jacksonian-era: 
In the half-century since the Revolution the population of the country had nearly 
quadrupled. The nation’s boundaries had been pushed southward to the Gulf of Mexico 
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and westward to the foothills of the Rockies. Industrialism took root in the Northeast, 
while America’s burgeoning population poured over the Appalachians in search of fertile 
land. (4) 
 
He continues on by describing the social and economic implications of this geographic 
expansion westward: “Economic enterprise throughout the nation was stimulated by legal 
changes which enhanced the opportunities of the risk-taker in the economy […] 
Storekeepers became merchants, craftsmen became capitalists” (Kohl 1989, 4). These 
changes in social, geographic, and economic aspects of society culminated in a culture 
shift that began to place supreme emphasis on the individual and his accomplishments: 
“The idea of the self-made man emerged as individuals scrambled to improve their 
station in life” (Kohl 1989, 4). The aforementioned republican emphasis on the public 
good and virtue are all but lost in this new society: “Men found themselves […] lost in a 
bustling world of strangers” (Kohl 1989, 4). The rise of individualism ought not be 
ascribed to the evolving social, geographic, and economic facets of society alone – Kohl 
describes a transformation occurring throughout the Western world at the turn of the 19th 
century, demarcating a transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ societies that reflects, on 
a larger scale, these societal changes seen in the United States.  
The changing nature of human interaction detached “the individual from the tight 
web of human relationships which characterized traditional societies” (Kohl 1989, 7). 
Traditional conceptions of the individual and his relationships, at least insofar as Kohl 
describes, are largely the result of the limited scale of life. In this context, the individual 
has no choice but to be closely bound to others. Though Kohl never mentions it, the idea 
of a traditional, socially interconnected life is not just compatible, but necessary for 
notions of Republicanism and civic humanism. Founding-era communities were often so 
small that they required this sort of social layout – all were interdependent on one 
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another, and from that collective investment arises a desire to ensure the public good. But 
as networks grew larger beyond traditionally smaller communities, the necessity for 
interconnectedness diminished. Tocqueville alludes to this societal transition when he 
first introduces the notion of ‘individualism’ as a departure from Western tradition. It is 
crucial to note that he does not intend to present individualism in a pejorative context; in 
fact, Tocqueville is careful in separating individualism from selfishness, labeling it as a 
“mature and calm feeling” that a man’s fate is in his own control (Kohl 1989, 11). 
It is evident that the modern context is much more a product of the liberal 
individualist society than that of civic republicanism. Despite sincere efforts to inspire 
civic involvement by countless politicians and organizations, the traditional ideals of 
community did not survive to the present day, irreparably fading from the conscience of 
the typical American.  
 
 History of the Second Amendment 
 
Having just described the actual paradigm transition from civic republicanism to 
liberal individualism, I will now address that shift in relation to the Second Amendment, 
describing the Amendment’s ideological origins and historical examples of early 
interpretation. 
Consider the relationship between the republic and its militia in antiquity. Citizen-
soldiers were integral to the fabric of classical republics, as they demonstrated the 
ultimate commitment to one’s land. Despite carrying on private lives and endeavors, 
citizens volunteered to collectively take up arms and defend the community. In doing so, 
they were not in pursuit of individual glory, but the public good. We can turn to 
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Pericles’s Funeral Oration to demonstrate both the level and nature of the sacrifice 
attained by the citizen-soldier who died in defense of Athens. Throughout the oration, 
Pericles never mentions any specific names of individuals who perished in warfare, 
instead emphasizing their collective status as Athenians, and posterity’s commitment to 
the future of Athens (Wick 1982, 112). Machiavelli and other Enlightenment-era 
Republicans also aver the usage of citizen armies for two reasons – first, citizen-soldiers 
were particularly invested in the land they are defending; second, serving the country in 
times of war has lasting, educatory effects on individuals, thus making them better 
citizens. Contrast these venerations of the militia and citizen-solider, who served the state 
insofar as it preserves the public and common good, with the notion of a standing army, 
which was regarded as solely a vehicle of the state as a matter of its occupational duty. 
Having described the role of the militia within the historical canon of Republicanism, I 
will now describe the early American debate between standing armies and citizen militias 
as a means of contextualizing the origins of the Second Amendment.  
The framers were careful in explicitly prohibiting the standing army as a means of 
defense. It appeared to be one of the most direct manifestations of tyranny and unchecked 
power for the colonies. Instead, early Americans sought militias in order to preserve their 
safety. While there existed a general consensus on the existence of militias for defense, 
the composition of militias was the subject of much debate in the time immediately 
following independence. Following his years on the frontline and witnessing the relative 
ineptitude of militia soldiers against the professional British military, George Washington 
was quick to start on a plan to shape up the military. Henry Knox, Washington’s 
Secretary at War, spearheaded the reform and eventually presented to the Second 
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Congress in January of 1790 (Cornell 2006, 66). The plan contained three stratifications 
of militia overseen by the federal government – advanced corps, main corps, and reserve 
corps. Though this system may not seem too foreign to a modern audience given the 
current structure of our military, it enraged early senators and representatives. Members 
of Congress struck down the proposal, and consensus was not reached. Discussion was 
temporarily tabled until later in the year, when Native Americans in Ohio Territory 
attached and defeated American forces (Cornell 2006, 66).  
While the Knox plan was ultimately not revisited, congressmen were quick to 
propose alternative solutions. Elias Boudinot, a Federalist from New Jersey, tried to 
prevent the creation of a universal militia; this aversion was very much in line with 
traditional Federalist thought, which preferred the Federal government organize such 
matters. James Jackson, a congressman from Georgia, fiercely argued in favor of 
universal militia service, calling on the republican obligation to be a soldier, “if it was 
only to prevent the introduction of that greatest of all evils, a standing army” (Cornell, 
2006, p. 67). Cornell also mentions Jackson’s civic implication of the right to bear arms, 
citing it as one of the “most important duties we owe society” (Cornell 2006, 67). Much 
to the chagrin of the Federalists, Congress ultimately (albeit narrowly) passed the 
Uniform Militia Act in March of 1792. Federalist criticism cited the overall lack of 
preparedness of the military, as well as the lack of consistency across states; those in 
favor of the bill lauded it as a crucial step in the effort to ensure protection of freedom, on 
individual as well as state levels.  
 As exemplified, the general discourse surrounding the Second Amendment within 
the early years of the United States was far from a consensus – despite this, both 
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statesmen and common folk maintained that citizens had an obligation to defend their 
states and communities. This mentality reflected a level of civic virtuousness that calls on 
ideals of republicanism that were held so chiefly during the 18th century. The 1776 
Pennsylvania Constitution grants citizens the right to “bear arms in defense of themselves 
and the state.” Proponents of the individual right are quick to ascribe this particular 
section as proof of a commitment to self-defense within a broad American conscience 
(Hardy 2007, 1253). By ascertaining this, they are utilizing (what they understand to be) 
a commitment to self-defense as evidence against a collective (or civic) understanding of 
the Second Amendment at large. However, a more comprehensive examination of the 
Pennsylvania Constitution reveals the fallacious nature of such an understanding rooted 
in self-defense. The Constitution not only permits the right to bear arms, but it legally 
binds citizens to bear arms:  
That every member of society hath a right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty 
and property, and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the expence of 
that protection, and yield his personal service, when necessary […] Nor can any man who 
is conscientiously scrupulous of bearing arms, be justly compelled thereto, if he will pay 
such equivalent.     
 
This section exemplifies the context under which the right to bear arms is 
presumed to have operated within the 1776 Pennsylvania Constitution. Citizens had a 
legal obligation to bear arms and defend their communities – if for whatever reason they 
could not fulfill this requirement, they were expected to pay something resembling a tax 
(Cornell 2004, 255). Had the Pennsylvania State Convention seen the right chiefly as a 
means of individual self-defense, as commonly defended by pro-gun advocates, there 
would have been no need to qualify parameters regarding the mandatory ownership of 
arms, or delineate consequences for those who choose not to bear arms.  
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Although he is not referencing the Pennsylvania Constitution in particular, Akhil 
Reed Amar (1997) aptly describes the prevailing viewpoint at the country’s Founding by 
comparing it to what he describes as political rights (though I understand them to be more 
as civic rights) such as voting, office-holding, and jury service (258). These rights are not 
exercised in an individual sense, but rather in one that embodies a republican right to the 
people. Whereas an individual right would refer to a right that is intended to have been 
applied on a singular, personal level. Consider the Fifth Amendment as an example of 
this, which begins with the text, “No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or 
otherwise infamous crime.” Within the text of this Amendment, the subject is clearly 
presented in a singular sense, as a “person.” While there may be classical republican 
morals within its context, we can read an overt individual-level protection into this 
Amendment. We can compare the texts of the Second and Fifth Amendments, thereby 
realizing their stark differences. With its rhetoric delineating the context of the militia, 
and referring to a “people” as opposed to “person,” the former lacks the individualized 
focus of the latter. Amar (2005) elucidates this distinction in the context of the Second 
Amendment, writing, “[W]hen the original Constitution spoke of ‘the people’ rather than 
‘persons,’ the collective connotation was primary” (324).3 
When examining ratification-era debates between both the Federalists (who were 
more sympathetic towards federally-supported militias) and Anti-Federalists (who 
vehemently defended state and community militias in fear of tyranny rooted in federal 
control of militias), the right to bear arms was almost explicitly utilized in the context of 
                                                        
3 Amar’s interpretation of the Amendment close resembles Cornell’s ‘civic right.’ He 
describes it as a ‘republican reading,’ against both collective and individual rights 
interpretations.  
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militias. Only one instance within the time period of ratification has been identified, and 
that is the Anti-Federalist Dissent of the Pennsylvania Minority. The authors of this 
Dissent, the Pennsylvania Constitutionalist Party, set out to protect arms specifically for 
purposes of self-defense, defense of the state, and killing game. They additionally sought 
to prohibit any laws disarming the population, unless a given population was deemed a 
threat to public safety. The modern libertarian may be quick to identify with the 
Pennsylvania Constitutionalists, using the group as an example of a pervasive individual-
rights conscience during the era of ratification. While their Dissent is worth noting, 
attempting to extrapolate anything substantive from it would be problematic. Historians 
generally agree that it was an atypical document given the preexisting climate of arms-
related discourse. These were radical statesmen from a rural area of the country that, by 
and large, did not have an effect on the ratification of the Constitution:  
 
The Dissent had almost no impact on the deliberations of the First Congress that drafted 
the Second Amendment. Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists were routed during the first 
federal election. Not only did the singers of the Dissent not participate in the First 
Congress, but Federalist Frederick Muhlenberg, who represented the state in Congress, 
disparaged the extremism of the Dissent in a letter to Federalist Benjamin Rush. Nor is 
there any evidence that Madison consulted the Dissent when he proposed his own draft of 
the Bill of Rights. (Cornell 2004, 260) 
 
By explicating the anomaly of the Pennsylvania Constitutionalists’ Dissent, I 
hope to have demonstrated the strong association of the right to bear arms and the militia. 
Modern discourse has divorced the two ideas, which is especially problematic given its 
alleged allegiance towards originalism. An honest originalist line of thought could not be 
so negligent as to ignore such a crucial component to the right to bear arms.  
 The founders’ fear regarding the anarchy of the mob was realized in the Carlisle 
Riot of late 1787. Upon Pennsylvania’s adoption of the Constitution, Federalists took to 
the street to celebrate their victory – they encountered Anti-Federalists, and their 
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interaction quickly escalated to violence (Cornell 2006, 56). Anti-Federalists were 
imprisoned for having instigated conflict, though it was not long before the local militia 
broke into the jail and freed those arrested. The militia acted separately from state (and 
federal) authority, asserting its own grounds for acting to liberate the jailed Anti-
Federalists. This populist interpretation regarding the militia and its lawful limits was far 
from the civic conception present within the minds of not only the Federalists, but also 
the (in their own right) radical Anti-Federalists who penned the Pennsylvania 
Constitutionalists’ Dissent. The Carlisle rioters placed the role of the community 
paramount, above both state and federal powers. They saw themselves as protecting 
against the impending Federalist disarming of the population, before ultimately instilling 
a standing army. One motivation for these riots was to galvanize moderate Anti-
Federalists into a more radical breed of their ideology – by exemplifying the 
disproportionate power possessed by the federal government, perhaps the state’s Anti-
Federalists could move to strike down the Constitution. However, these riots had the 
opposite effect, effectively marginalizing the extreme factions of the Anti-Federalists and 
pushing the coalition to a more moderate position. The riots demonstrated “that continued 
opposition would only lead to instability and mob rule” (Cornell 2006, 57). 
Proponents of an individual right to bear arms will often appeal to the grounds 
personal self-defense as justification for their beliefs. One first instance of a court 
challenge to this can be traced back to the end of the 18th century. Amidst riots regarding 
the Alien and Sedition Acts, William Duane, editor of the antiestablishment Philadelphia 
Aurora, Dr. James Reynolds, and two other resident aliens were attacked by a mob of 
Federalists. In an attempt to scare off members of the mob, Reynolds brandished a 
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firearm – all four men were charged with inciting riot, and although the crowd quickly 
disarmed him, Reynolds was also charged with assault with a deadly weapon (Cornell 
2006, 89). The subsequent trial called into question the extent to which the natural right 
of self-defense was to be understood. The case was crucial in setting the groundwork for 
attitudes towards the right to bear arms in the generation following the adoption of the 
Constitutional Congress. The prosecution affirmed that Reynolds and Duane had a right 
to assembly, but because the other two individuals in the group were aliens, they were not 
necessarily protected by the amendment. These constitutional protections did not 
constitute an individual right, they argued; rather, these protections were associated with 
citizenship.  
When it came to the gun charge, the defense did not turn toward the Pennsylvania 
Constitution’s statement of the right to bear arms as justification for his possession of 
Reynolds’s firearm. The prosecution maintained Reynolds’s guilt by pointing to the fact 
that brandishing the firearm was not his last resort. He stood his ground in order to avoid 
insult and/or minor injury, and thus forfeited his right to self-defense. Had his life truly 
been in danger, he could have just fled the scene. The right to self-defense would not be 
conflated with the constitutional right to bear arms – instead, Reynolds’ attorneys 
appealed to the common law idea of self-defense. By wielding his gun to the attacking 
angry mob, the defense hoped to show that Reynolds was clearly not demonstrating 
criminal intent. One of Reynolds’ chief defendants, Alexander Dallas, cited the lack of 
any existing law to legislate arms ownership: “There is no law in Pennsylvania to prevent 
it; every man has a right to carry arms who apprehends himself to be in danger” (Cornell 
2006, 91). The four were eventually acquitted on all indictments, including Reynolds’s 
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firearm charge. The ambiguous nature of self-defense in these early years is demonstrated 
by the contentious nature of this case. The founders left no real precedent or 
understanding as to how a case of this nature ought to be handled.  
In 1806, the notion of self-defense was again considered in relation to the right to 
bear arms. Federalist Thomas Selfridge was charged with the murder of Jeffersonian 
Charles Austin. Selfridge’s defense rested on the idea that Selfridge acted in self-defense, 
as Austin confronted and attempted to beat him with a cane. The state of Massachusetts 
argued that Selfridge did not have the right to use lethal force given the circumstances of 
Austin’s attack. Because it was on a crowded city, and not on a highway or in an isolated 
town, Selfridge could have called on others for aid. The Massachusetts Attorney General, 
James Sullivan, argued that while there is a given time and place to bear arms, “it could 
not be necessary at noon day, and when going on so public a place” (Cornell 2006, 113). 
Sullivan likened Selfridge’s concealment of his gun to that of an assassin, not an innocent 
citizen defending himself. Selfridge’s defense invoked the right to bear arms, citing that 
“every man has a right to possess military arms” and “to furnish his rooms with them” 
(Cornell 2006, 113). However, the Second Amendment was not the primary mode by 
which he sought to base Selfridge’s defense. Instead, it was grounded in the common law 
notion of self-defense, greatly resembling the defense of Reynolds less than a decade 
earlier. Both sides presented compelling arguments that represented a vast divergence on 
the extent to which self-defense could justify the possession of arms. Ultimately, the 
court once again decided in favor of the defendants, citing the expanding definition of the 
right to self-defense as grounds for arms possession and use.  
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Like all political debates (especially within the context of early American 
history), the right to self-defense was ideologically charged at the turn of the 18th century. 
Broadly, Antifederalists understood a significantly narrower conception of the right to 
self-defense and its relationship with bearing arms. Federalists, having championed 
notions of liberal individuality, were keen to wider definitions of self-defense and bearing 
arms. Instead of being a constitutional right, self-defense was a common law right. While 
individuals undeniably did have a right to self-defense, disagreement emerged over the 
extent to which this right could be exercised in the context of bearing arms – this was the 
arena for discourse, rather than the modern day assessment of applying the Second 
Amendment as a means of self-defense. There was little to no appeal to the Second 
Amendment specifically in the context of self-defense, and neither party would have 
endorsed the modern-day divorce of the right of self-defense from its common law roots.  
As previously described, the time period after the War of 1812, specifically the 
Jacksonian period, saw drastic erosion in the traditional Republican ideology that was so 
pervasive during the Colonial era – Alexis de Tocqueville, in his famous travels of the 
United States remarked “a distinguishing characteristic of American society in the 1830s, 
the era of Jacksonian democracy, was a pervasive spirit of individualism” (Cornell 2006, 
138). Tocqueville observed the prevalent practice of travelling with concealed arms as 
one manifestation of this individualist attitude. The idea of concealing arms has clear 
implications of self-defense, and thus is an important consideration when examining the 
constitutional grounding of arms for self-defense. In addition to shifts in political thought 
during the post-war, Jacksonian era, economic changes affected the landscape of gun 
ownership as well. Industrialization spurred the manufacturing of handguns – with this 
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increased manufacturing, handguns became cheaper, and as a result, more widely owned. 
The abundance of these weapons had tangible impact on the greater society as well:  
The proliferation of handguns and knives not only led to more deadly interpersonal 
violence, but also to an escalation in the number of mortalities resulting from collective 
violence. […] Rioting and mob action wreaked havoc on American towns and cities […] 
Firearms played a central role in the carnage of this era. (Cornell 2006, 140).  
 
 Beginning in 1813, states began restricting the carry of handguns so as to 
minimize the overall harm they presented to the population at large. Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Georgia, Virginia, Alabama, and Ohio all passed laws against the possession of 
concealed weapons. Though this attitude was prevalent in some states, other states moved 
towards producing a more capacious understanding of the right to self-defense in relation 
to arms. In 1819, Mississippi defined that each citizen had a right “to bear arms in 
defense of himself and the state,” and a year later, Connecticut followed suit and passed 
similar legislation. Missouri presented an interesting case, as it framed the right to bear 
arms within the right of assembly, reaffirming the original militia roots of arms in an 
almost civic context. We can turn to the Michigan constitutional convention in 1835 for a 
clear-cut discussion over these two paradigms, individual and civic. Initially, the 
convention adopted individual rights phrasing similar to that of Mississippi, before 
turning towards more civic language: “Every citizen shall have a right to keep and bear 
arms in the common defense.” Ultimately, the convention maintained individual rights 
language, but convention records indicate a lengthy debate over the merits of each 
respective paradigm.  
 
 
 
 25 
Judicial Opinions and the Right to Bear Arms 
I will now describe the historical trajectory of Second Amendment judicial 
interpretation, as I believe that this will help in attaining a more comprehensive 
understanding of the setting of any current discourse. As previously mentioned, the 
original understanding of the Amendment (and thus, the understanding that any true 
originalists ought to subscribe) was that of a civic right. This reserved an individual right 
to bear arms in the context of the militia. This was not necessarily a universal consensus, 
as there existed groups with contrarian views (take the Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist 
Dissenters as an example); still, the civic understanding was the apparent accepted view 
in the eyes of the founders and thus, early courts. 
Bliss v. Commonwealth (1822) was the first major challenge to the recently 
implemented gun control laws, and it represented a major victory for supporters of the 
individual right. The court essentially struck down concealed carry laws on the grounds 
that the right to bear arms was not subject to regulation. In contrast to prior cases that 
defended the possession of arms on the common law grounds of self-defense, the Bliss 
court specifically cited the Constitution as reason for the striking down any gun bans: 
“Whatever restrains the full and complete exercise of that right [to bear arms], though not 
an entire destruction of it, is forbidden by the explicit language of the Constitution” 
(Cornell 2006, 144). The decision was met with serious backlash – the idea of 
constitutionally grounding an individual right to bear arms was ridiculed by members of 
the Kentucky State House of Representatives, who accused the court of misunderstanding 
the historical origins of the right. In the years that followed Bliss, there were similar 
challenges to the constitutionality of banning concealed handguns, though most decisions 
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did not follow its precedent. However, one case in particular is worth noting – in 1852, 
the defense for Matthew Ward, a Kentucky man charged with the murder of William 
Butler, invoked the Bliss decision as grounds for the constitutional right to bear arms. 
Ward ended up acquitted, much to the outrage of many within Kentucky who believed 
that the Second Amendment could not possibly be used to defend the killing of Butler. 
 Following Bliss, a multitude of court cases rejected the individual rights reading 
of the Second Amendment in favor of a more civic interpretation. The 1840 case Aymette 
v. State challenged the constitutionality of a Tennessee law against bowie knives by 
appealing to the right to bear arms. The court ultimately ruled that these regulations were 
perfectly constitutional. The Second Amendment had specific provisions regarding the 
right to bear arms, and the notion of bearing arms was said to have only referred to 
military weapons:  
A man in pursuit of deer, elk, and buffaloes might carry his rifle every day, for forty years, 
and yet, it would never be said of him, that had borne arms, much less could it be said, that 
a private citizen bears arms, because he has a dirk, or pistol cocnelaed under his clothes, or 
a spear in a cane. (Cornell 2006, 146) 
 
The court affirmed that while it would certainly be unconstitutional to regulate rifles and 
military weapons of that sort, but the legislature was free to regulate pistols or other 
weapons that had negligible value in promoting the maintenance of a well-regulated 
militia (Cornell 2006, 146).     
As demonstrated, the Second Amendment was originally understood with civic 
conceptions of the militia and public good in mind. The notion of bearing arms was 
understood in a strictly military context, with no intention on extending this right to the 
private, individual sphere. Even into the mid-19th century, there existed a strong 
relationship between gun ownership and citizenship. In the original historical context, the 
 27 
notion that the Second Amendment guaranteed a right to own and operate guns for the 
purposes of private self-defense was preposterous, even laughable. But the Jacksonian 
period ushered in an era of heightened individualism, which, combined with the mass 
proliferation of handguns (and thus, firearm-related court cases), began changing the way 
the Amendment was judicially considered.    
Throughout the 19th century, there was no real prevailing judicial opinion on the 
Second Amendment. The civic interpretation represented the traditional paradigm by 
which the Amendment was understood, while the latent individual interpretation 
represented the opposite end of the continuum of jurisprudence. The range of opinions on 
these cases, challenging the Second Amendment and invoking the right to bear arms, fell 
on a spectrum between these two extremes, with no particular camp dominating judicial 
opinion.  
The early 1870s saw a series of lawsuits from the Department of Justice cracking 
down on activities of the Ku Klux Klan – the KKK seized arms of Black militias that 
were funded and supplied by the state government of South Carolina,. These black 
militias assumed a role akin to that of original, Founding-era militias, soon becoming “an 
indispensable political and military institution, providing a means of protecting and 
organizing freedmen” (Cornell 2006, 176). They possessed analogous social importance 
as well: “the social role of the militias within the African-American community was at 
least as important as its military function” (Cornell 2006, 176). The militia represented 
the essence of African-American citizenship, and as a result, infringement on such was 
harmful, both practically and symbolically. 
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The Klan was brought up on a number of charges, including the grounds that they 
violated the Amendment, as they disarmed individuals who comprised a state militia. The 
prosecution attempted to use the Fourteenth Amendment to incorporate the Amendment 
on the grounds of this civic understanding, protecting the right for citizens in the civic 
militia context to individually possess arms. While the Klan members were ultimately 
convicted of different charges, the prosecution’s attempt at Second Amendment 
incorporation failed, as the Supreme Court maintained that the Amendment represented a 
state right, incapable of federal incorporation. In other words, the federal right to bear 
arms could not, at least in this instance, be incorporated within the state of South 
Carolina; rather, the court ruled that this protection was up to state discretion to monitor 
arms usage so long as the state did not interfere with, given the Amendment’s original 
intention of protecting state militias. Notably, the Klan’s defense did not even attempt to 
justify its possession of arms under the guise of an individual right. Instead, the defense 
maintained that the Klan was protecting the state against the recklessness and 
terrorization of the black militias.  
These cases played an important role in implementing the ‘state’s right’ 
understanding of the Amendment, just before the landmark case United States v. 
Cruikshank (1876), which solidified the right for states to regulate arms usage. The case 
followed an incident now known as the Colfax Massacre, in which white militias attacked 
a group of primarily black freedmen over a disputed election. The white militia members 
were prosecuted on a number of charges, including the deprivation of citizens’ free 
exercise and enjoyment of rights or privileges granted or secured by the Constitution, 
including the right to bear arms (Cornell 2006, 192). These sentiments are reminiscent of 
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prior notions of incorporation that were ultimately rejected in the earlier Klan cases. The 
lower circuit court ruled in favor of the prosecution, upholding the capacity for federal 
oversight of Second Amendment infringements. Justice William Woods, who presided 
over the circuit court decision, affirmed an individual rights interpretation of the 
Amendment. This line of thought is reasonable considering Woods’s own assertion that 
the right to bear arms was guaranteed of the Constitution, and that the white militiamen 
violated this right. However, the lower-court ruling was ultimately reversed at the 
Supreme Court level, as the majority opinion asserted the military focus of the right, 
wholly unlike the purported individual focus of the earlier decision. The Court also 
distinguished between the common law right to keep and carry arms from the Second 
Amendment; while there exists a common law right to self-defense, and arms possession 
may be permitted under a broader definition of such, it would be erroneous to conflate the 
role of the Second Amendment with ideals of self-defense. This ruling effectively 
marginalized individual rights interpretations of the Amendment, establishing that it is 
solely intended to restrict the powers of the national government, and “states were free to 
enact whatever measures they deemed appropriate regarding the militia or firearms, as 
long as these laws were nondiscriminatory” (Cornell 2006, 195).  
The definition of the ‘state right,’ as I am using it, is a distinct entity from the 
aforementioned ‘collective right,’ but before I examine this distinction, I wish to 
recapitulate how the original ‘civic right’ ought to be understood. The civic right holds 
individual citizens’ arms ought to be protected in militia contexts. There is a protection of 
individuals’ right to bear arms within the civic right, but it differs from the individual 
right interpretation; the latter centralizes self-defense as justification for arms possession, 
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while the former protects arms possession in defense of the public sphere. The 
state/collective right cannot affirm an individual right in any capacity, leaving arms 
regulation to states as long as their regulations do not infringe on state militias, or later, 
the National Guard. 
The beginning of the 20th century saw vast changes for the traditional mode of 
militia infrastructure. Militias were seen as obsolete institutions that could not be 
expected to legitimately protect against foreign threats. The Dick Act of 1903 and the 
National Defense Act of 1916 were crucial pieces of legislation that nationalized the 
function of the militia, ultimately creating the National Guard. Essentially, this 
reorganization meant the formal eradication of state militias as the founders imagined and 
intended. No longer could the ideal of the citizen-soldier, civically conditioned 
minuteman exist; instead, he was replaced with the National Guardsman, who was an 
agent of the state, an occupational defender. Of course, the transition to the National 
Guard was not wholly the result of a cultural shift, as there were practical shortcomings 
of the state militia that facilitated its demise. But this transition is important to consider, 
especially as it pertains to the idea of a collective rights interpretation of the Second 
Amendment. Instead of the interpretation assuming a ‘state right’ that preserves state 
militias, the emphasis is now the preservation of arms to the National Guard within the 
‘collective right.’ 
The 20th century saw one major Supreme Court case challenge the interpretation 
of the right to bear arms. In United States v. Miller (1939), Jack Miller and Frank Layton 
were charged with illegally transporting an unregistered sawed-off shotgun across state 
lines, in violation to the National Firearms Act of 1834. The Arkansas District Court 
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overturned the indictment, citing protection of the right to bear arms under the Second 
Amendment. However, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision, citing the 
clear militia intentions of the Amendment. The Court manufactured a two-layered test to 
determine its applicability to its interpretation of the Second Amendment — whether the 
type weapon could be used in a militia, and whether it was being used in a militia context 
(Cornell 2006, 203). The Court lambasted the notion that a sawed-off shotgun could pass 
for a militia weapon, even if Miller and Layton were operating within the scope of a 
militia. The majority opinion fused civic and state/collective views of how we ought to 
consider the Amendment, though throughout the 20th century, scholars emphasized the 
latter due to its “hegemonic dominance” of legal thought (Cornell 2006, 202).  
Since the mid-19th century, the individual rights interpretation was pushed to the 
margins of Second Amendment interpretation given its apparent lack of historical 
legitimacy. Supporters of the individual right won their first recent victory, albeit a minor 
one, in the 2001 Fifth Circuit case, United States v. Emerson. While the ruling upheld an 
individual right to bear arms, it did not engage in judicial review to alter any preexisting 
regulations of arms possession. The individual right won its first major victory in the 
2008 Supreme Court Case District of Columbia v. Heller, which centralized a 
commitment to self-defense within the Second Amendment. Much of the majority 
decision consisted of a historical review, tracing the supposed relationship between arms 
possession and self-defense from English common law, as well as writings of Blackstone 
and Locke. Heller had an enormous impact on jurisprudence since the ruling, given the 
lack in judicial precedent over the Amendment. It endorsed the individual right as the 
mode by which the . It has been cited in numerous cases, most notably in a 2010 Supreme 
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Court Case, McDonald v. Chicago, which effectively incorporated the individual right 
and applied it to the states.  
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Originalist Interpretations, Paradigm Shifts, and the Second Amendment 
 
In this chapter, I argue that it is impossible to maintain any serious commitments to 
originalism as applied to Second Amendment cases, given the radical discontinuity across 
cultural paradigms. Because the conceptual orientation of the Founding-era differs to 
such an extent from that of today, no form of originalism (or level of originalist 
abstraction) can provide adequate means for guiding modern Second Amendment 
interpretation. I criticize the majority opinion of Heller, which affirms the individual right 
on grounds of original meaning, on the grounds of cursory historical analysis, as well as 
neglect of the paradigm shift.  
 
Originalism and its Forms 
In this section, I will define originalism and distinguish different versions of 
originalism that have been advanced over time. I draw largely on the distinctions of 
originalism outlined by Peter J. Smith’s, “How Different are Originalism and Non-
Originalism?” (Smith 2011). I understand the label of ‘originalism’ to represent any 
theory of constitutional interpretation that sees “the discoverable meaning of the 
Constitution at the time of its initial adoption as authoritative for purposes of 
constitutional interpretation in the present” (Whittington 2004, 599).  
Early originalists, in the 1970s, sought to utilize the original intent of the framers 
in an effort to ground the Constitution in a set framework, thereby preventing loose 
interpretations of the document (Berger 1977). This first conception of originalism was 
introduced in response to the perceived recklessness of judicial activism, and thus served 
primarily a reactive and critical role, leaving little room for positive interpretation. This 
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form of originalism – privileging the original intent of the framers – is what Smith refers 
to as “Old Originalism” (Smith 2011, 708). These intentions were regarded as static 
notions, frozen over time, and thus any appeal to them would have been considered 
applying objective and unbiased standards. Strictly adhering to this sort of originalist 
ideology proved to be difficult for two additional reasons: first, it is virtually impossible 
to derive any uniform “collective” intent out from the writings of the Founders; second, 
historical examination has indicated that the founders specifically did not intend on 
posterity considering their intent in Constitutional interpretation (Powell 1985, Powell 
1987, Smith 2011).   
In response to the difficulties presented by Old Originalism, some originalists 
moved to analyzing the “original meaning,” or “public meaning” of the text. These “New 
Originalists,” as Smith calls them, maintain that some objective textual meaning can be 
ascertained in interpretation, and the primary way by which textual meaning can be 
understood is by asking how a reasonable person in the 18th-century would have 
understood the given section of the Constitution. While the goal of this sort of new 
originalism is to get an unbiased viewpoint of the Constitution, this sort of objectivity has 
proved incredibly difficult because 18th-century citizens routinely disagreed over issues 
of meaning. The focus on original meaning inevitably commands that some degree of 
interpretation will occur, as the scholar must collect the relevant historical and cultural 
information in order to validate how a given section of the Constitution is to be 
understood. New Originalism abstracts the Constitution to a more general level than that 
of Old Originalist supporters of original intent – from framers’ intent to broad citizen 
agreement - and allows for positive interpretation so long as it remains faithful to the 
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original meaning. 
Smith presents a third development, “New New Originalism,” as a fairly recent 
theory that emerged out of New Originalism (Smith 2011, 716). As New Originalism has 
its focus on objective meaning, some originalists have been led to “conclude that at least 
some provisions of the Constitution are properly interpreted at a high level of generality” 
(Smith 2011, 716). The main distinction of New New Originalism from New Originalism 
is that the former maintains that we can work beyond mere constitutional interpretation, 
into the realm of constitutional construction. This distinction between constitutional 
interpretation and constitutional construction is a crucial one, and Lawrence Solum 
(2010) articulates it well. The former refers to the recognition of actual semantic content, 
or linguistic meaning, of any given part of the Constitution. Solum employs the example 
of the First Amendment to demonstrate what constitutes semantic meaning:  
[T]he First Amendment freedom of speech has a linguistic meaning, associated with the 
meanings of the constituent words and phrases – “Congress,” “shall make,” “no,” “law,” 
“abridging,” “the freedom of speech,” and further specified by the conventions of syntax 
and grammar that allow these words and phrases to be combined into a meaningful whole. 
(99)  
 
The act of synthesizing the amalgamation of words and phrases in the constitution 
is precisely what comprises constitutional interpretation. At the heart of the debate 
between Old and New Originalism is the question of how we ought to interpret the 
original constitutional text itself, whether the intentions of the founders, or the objective 
public meaning, is being conveyed. On the other hand, constitutional construction refers 
to translation of “semantic content of the constitutional text (its linguistic meaning) into 
the legal content of the constitutional doctrine (or rules of constitutional law)” (Solum 
2010, 104). Construction, which inevitably involves a creative or activist role for judges, 
gives meaning to the semantics and provides a legal thrust absent with solely 
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interpretation. Solum prescribes interpretation as a means of resolving ambiguity, and 
construction as a means of resolving vagueness (Solum 2009, 974). I found these 
characterizations to be especially useful in contextualizing applications of New New 
Originalism – ambiguity implies that interpretation can help decipher unclear portions of 
the Constitution without extra invention, whereas vagueness implies that there is implicit, 
perhaps intentional, generality that requires constructive effort in order to arrive at a 
constitutionally justified conclusion. Given the high levels of generality that New New 
Originalists assume, along with the refocused emphasis on construction rather than 
interpretation, there is significant discourse exploring whether this method of 
interpretation may even be considered as a form of originalism at all. New New 
Originalism accepts that some degree of creativity is inevitable when resolving existing 
vagueness. Thus, in a sense, this form of Originalism seemingly relaxes commitments to 
strict objectivity, as emphasized in prior iterations of Originalism.  
 
 Originalism Across Paradigms 
 In this section, I will investigate the nature by which originalism may be posited 
across cultural paradigms. I will ultimately conclude that originalism, regardless of its 
variation, fails to adequately account for cultural paradigm shifts.  
 Recapitulating earlier portions of this paper, I posit that there exists a significant 
shift in cultural paradigms from the colonial and Founding-eras to modern day. I maintain 
that a civic republican paradigm dominated early portions of American society, and, 
while liberalism existed to some degree, there appeared to be a primary emphasis placed 
on the public and its wellbeing. Civic republicanism began to fade in the early 19th 
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century, and liberal individualism took its place as the dominant paradigm. I argue that 
the public sphere, at least insofar as the founders imagined, dissolved in the transition to 
liberal individualism. Modern society reflects advancement within the paradigm of liberal 
individualism; no analogous paradigm shift has occurred since that of civic 
republicanism-liberal individualism. 
Consider Old Originalism as a mode of Second Amendment interpretation. This 
dictates that the intent of the framers is to be regarded as the mode by which we 
determine the legitimacy of the Amendment. The difficulties of Old Originalism 
notwithstanding, we must ask what the Founders intended by ratifying the Second 
Amendment. While there was no universal consensus regarding the specifics of gun 
ownership, historical examinations indicate that the Amendment was to be understood in 
a civic context, as detailed in Chapter Two. Insofar as cultural paradigms are concerned, 
founding-era Second Amendment discourse operated within the arena of Civic 
Republicanism and therefore, it logically follows that the Founders’ intentions reside 
within the paradigm. The Amendment was crafted under the assumption that militias 
would remain vitally important aspects of society, gun ownership was limited to muskets 
that were virtually incapable of covert self-defense, and posterity would retain the virtues 
of civic republicanism. It would be fallacious to assume that the Founders foresaw the 
dissolution of the militia, advancement and mass proliferation in gun technology, and the 
overall transition to liberal individualism – as a result, we cannot confidently assert any 
sort of interpretation. In the relatively straightforward, interpretive manner that Old 
Originalism seems to favor, it would be impossible to maintain commitments to original 
intent amidst such discontinuity.  
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Having shown the difficulty in subscribing to original intent originalism, or Old 
Originalism, I will now demonstrate the problematic implications of New Originalism, 
which relies on the original meaning. Exactly what was the objective, original meaning of 
the Second Amendment to the 18th-century citizens? Examining the Amendment’s 
phrasing of ‘bear[ing] arms’ may be a start. We can turn to Nathan Kozuskanich’s (2008) 
study of archival databases as quantitative evidence of the wording ‘bear arms’ indicating 
a military context. Kozuskanich surveyed the phrase across colonial/founding-era (1763-
1791) pamphlets, newspaper articles, government documents, letters, and journals, and 
found that in the overwhelming majority of cases, the term ‘bear arms’ was used in a 
military context. The history and role of militias in public life confirm the obvious 
military connotations of the Amendment. This context aids us in understanding New 
Originalism’s central question of how a reasonable 18th-century individual would 
understand a given part of the Constitution. While we are still faced with the ever-present 
issue of a lack of universal consensus, this instance is fairly clear-cut in regards to its 
objective meaning. This 18th-century individual would have seen the aim of the 
Amendment was to protect his gun ownership, though the wording is restrictive to 
military contexts. And while there are exceptions to this mainstream view – consider the 
Pennsylvania Anti-Federalist dissenters as an example – the abundant evidence points 
toward the inextricable link between the Amendment, gun ownership, and the militia. 
Given these assertions, the subsequent course of action for the New Originalist 
would presumably be to uphold the logical extension of the objective meaning into 
modern jurisprudence. However, this task may prove to be impossible, given the radical 
discontinuity across paradigms. Jack Rakove (2000) sums up the issue with this sort of 
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thought experiment well: 
Because eighteenth-century firearms were not nearly as threatening or lethal as those 
available today, we similarly cannot expect the discussants of the late 1780s to have cast 
their comments about keeping and bearing arms in the same terms that we would. Theirs 
was a rhetoric of public liberty, not public health; of the danger from standing armies, not 
that of casual strangers, embittered family members, violent youth gangs, freeway 
snipers, and careless weapons keepers. Guns were so difficult to fire in the eighteenth 
century that the very idea of being accidentally killed by one was itself hard to 
conceive (110). 
 
Society and technology have evolved to such great lengths, that it is no longer feasible to 
attempt any sort of dialogue reconciling past and present evaluations of the gun’s role in 
society. To the common, reasonably minded 18th century citizen, guns could not have 
been understood as vehicles for harm (or self-defense for that matter) in non-warfare 
settings. The evolution of the gun, as well as its role in society, has irreparably shaped 
any modern perceptions of it. The fact that guns could not have been understood outside 
this military context precludes any potential individual, self-defense rhetoric from being 
considered. The evident disconnectedness across the paradigm shifts, from colonial-era 
and modern societies, renders any serious commitment to original meaning as impossible.  
Solum describes supporters for constitutional construction in the context of 
original public meaning (New New Originalists) as, “explicitly embrac[ing] the idea that 
when the original public meaning of the text ‘runs out,’ application of the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional case to a particular dispute must be guided by something 
other than original meaning” (Solum 2009, 934). This accurately represents the problem 
of original public meaning in the instance of the Second Amendment, as original public 
meaning of the Second Amendment is simply no longer coherent in a modern context. 
The New New Originalist would promote construction based on factors other than strictly 
original meaning, including (but not limited to) political and creative acts of judicial 
construction (Smith 2011, 718). I agree with Smith’s assertion that New New Originalism 
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deviates so far from the roots of originalism that it no longer may be understood as 
originalism. As I understand it, the scope of originalism is limited to theories of 
interpretation that remain “value neutral” or at most, “thinly normative” (Solum 2010, 
104). The introduction of construction violates this air of impartiality, as we are now 
forced to consider any multitude of factors that aid us in resolving vagueness.  
Now consider the implications of the cultural paradigm shift on New New 
Originalism. Any sort of construction that a New New Originalist endorses will require 
substantive “creative” work that departs far from the starting points of originalism. 
Chapter Two’s examination of Founding-era society and militias demonstrated the 
original public meaning of the Second Amendment as embedded within the civic 
republican context. As New New Originalists are attempting to provide modern 
constructions and guide modern jurisprudence of the Amendment, they will inevitably 
attempt to conform the Amendment to the constraints of liberal individualist society. To 
employ these modern readings on the Amendment, thereby divorcing it from its original 
meaning, is incredibly problematic. Returning to Smith’s critique of New New 
Originalism, this leaves us with nothing even remotely originalist about how we ought to 
understand the Amendment.    
  
Heller Opinions Against Paradigm Shifts 
 Given Heller’s canonical status Second Amendment case law (as well as that of 
originalism), its majority serves as a valuable resource in analyzing the role of the 
paradigm shift. Throughout the opinion, Justice Scalia asserts that the Second 
Amendment guarantees an individual right to bear arms. He begins by separating the 
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prefatory and operatory clauses of the Amendment – the prefatory clause contains the 
initial part, “A well-regulated militia, being necessary to the security of a free state,” 
while the operatory clause consists of “the right of the people to keep and bear arms, shall 
not be infringed.” He utilizes this distinction to affirm that the prefatory clause 
“announces the purpose for which the right was codified,” but cannot limit or expand the 
scope of the operatory clause (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). Scalia arrives at this 
conclusion after systematically dissecting every phrase of the Amendment, teasing out an 
individual rights reading in each instance.  
For example, take his attempt at ascertaining the ‘people’ of the operative clause. 
Scalia strikes the legitimacy of the militia as the subject of the ‘people,’ given the 
tendency for ‘the people’ to have referred to all members of the political community. The 
militia’s composition, being of male, able-bodied, within an age range, is restrictive in 
this regard, as it is not encompassing of all members of the political community. As a 
result, we cannot maintain any militia implications for the clause. I take issue with this 
dismissal, and I believe it to be a dangerous oversight of historical analysis. While, Scalia 
is correct in asserting that participation in militia was populated by white men of certain 
status, he fails to pronounce the link between militia participation and citizenship. ‘The 
People’ of the Founding era, i.e., the political community by Scalia’s definition, did not 
possess any sort of universal characteristic, as seemingly assumed in the majority 
opinion. Blacks and women were two major groups that were marginalized from 
inclusion within a political community – they did not comprise ‘the People.”4 It appears 
                                                        
4 And if inclusion into ‘the People’ was a universal trait, how could the Founders 
maintain the sacred ideal that “all men are created equal” despite overt inequality to 
members within this purported community?  
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that Scalia superimposes modern standards of universal inclusion of the political 
community, attempting to extrapolate such ideals to an era that only permitted inclusion 
for white males of a certain status.  
The Founding-era equated the ‘People’ with those who participate in the militia, 
and modern efforts to divorce the two are problematic. Dismissing the militia 
connotations of the Amendment on the basis of defining ‘the People’ as “unambiguously 
refer[ring] to all members of the political community,” is unwarranted and indicative of 
clearly ideological jurisprudence (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). In the same 
sentence, the opinion reads that the ‘people’ are not to protect “an unspecified subset” 
(District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). “This implies that the militia is an “unspecified 
subset,” an assertion that could not be further from the truth. In a Founding-era context, 
the militia is clearly delineated as to include all citizens, therefore, all members of the 
political community. The opinion is gravely mistaken when it reads, “[T]he ‘militia’ in 
colonial America consisted of a subset of ‘the people’—those who were male, able 
bodied, and within a certain age range” (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). So long as 
we define ‘the People’ by members of the political community, the militia was not 
merely a “subset,” but the militia and the ‘people’ were one in the same entity. Given the 
interconnectedness of the ‘People’ and the militia, this definition of the ‘People’ does not 
contradict a militia reading of the Amendment; in fact, I believe that it endorses such a 
reading.  
We ought not dismiss the militia meaning of the Amendment out of convenience, 
as this treats originalism (which in this instance is original meaning) with light regard. 
We cannot remain steadfast in commitments to original meaning while distorting its 
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scope. These ideas linking citizenship and militia service are embedded within the 
Founding-era paradigm – how can we reconcile the paradigm transition with modern 
inclusivity? The political community has grown to become substantially more capacious 
of individuals of all groups willing to legally attain citizenship. In order to make sense 
out this question, perhaps the New Originalists would ask the following question: if civic 
militias still existed (and thus, we never transitioned out of the civic republican 
paradigm), would it be fair to assume that non-Whites, along with women, would be 
obligated to serve in the militia given their statuses as citizens, members of the political 
community, and entities within the proverbial ‘People’? If the answer to this question is 
yes, then perhaps we may be more sympathetic to some sort of broader-based right – still, 
not for the purposes of individual self-defense, but a civic right, the public’s ability to 
protect itself. But the reality is that the paradigm transition from the Founding-era to 
today, whereby the civic militia and the civic realm that it inhabited dissolved, renders 
such thought experiments useless. As long as the civic militia no longer exists, a serious 
originalist could not abstract any right from such a thought experiment (and use it to 
justify or oppose arms ownership), especially when considering that the Amendment is 
derived from the existence of a militia and its role within the civic sphere.  
The militia context of the Amendment has obvious implications for its 
interpretation. The majority opinion conveniently dismisses the power of the prefatory 
clause, having cited its role as “announc[ing] the purpose for which the right was 
codified,” but voiding it of power to expand or reduce the scope of the operative clause 
(District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). Now free of the originally intended context that 
the prefatory clause establishes, the majority opinion reads modern liberal individualist 
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values into the operative clause, and thus, the right to individual right to bear arms as a 
means of self-defense is created. We can point to the cultural paradigm shift as the 
impetus for this confusion and disconnectedness. Both the prefatory and operative clauses 
are embedded within the civic republican paradigm, and by divorcing them, we are 
stripping them of their respective meanings. Especially in this instance wherein the 
majority opinion assigns the operative clause to a modern, liberal individualist context, 
there is discontinuity between the operative clause and the prefatory clause, which cannot 
be reasonably understood outside of a civic republican, militia context. The majority 
opinion’s dismissal of the prefatory clause is the direct product of this paradigm 
transition, and serves as the bedrock for the argument endorsing an individual right to 
bear arms for the purposes of self-defense. 
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Conclusion 
In existing scholarship, both pertaining to the Second Amendment and originalist 
modes of interpretation, I have yet to encounter an appreciation for the critical role that 
cultural paradigms play in constitutional interpretation. Scholars have alluded to 
implications of societal change (consider Solum’s notion of objective meaning “running 
out”), but none have specifically attributed difficulties in Second Amendment 
interpretation to any such paradigm shift. Founding-era history and context is embedded 
within the Second Amendment, and so long as we maintain commitments to originalism, 
we must try and ascertain either the Founders’ intention or the original public meaning of 
a given part of the Constitution, both of which are wedded to the societal paradigm. 
Regardless one’s specific originalist reading, the civic mode of interpretation emerges as 
the clear original meaning/intention of the Amendment, as any comprehensive historical 
examination of the Amendment and its context will indicate. The militia stood as a 
crucial institution to this time period, and arms ownership had an inseparable relationship 
with citizenship. The obligation for citizens to participate in militias was not necessarily a 
legal one (though it was legally mandated), but more so an obligation predicated on the 
importance of the public and community. However, the paradigm shift (I consider 
technological, political, and moral evolutions of society to be subsumed under the 
umbrella of the paradigm shift) has not only rendered traditional republican virtues as 
obsolete, but it has completely altered the culture of guns. These radical changes between 
Founding-era and modern societies have made it impossible to remain loyal to originalist 
interpretation. 
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The paradigm shift from civic republicanism to liberal individualism did not 
happen instantaneously. I posit that modern society is not the product of natural growth 
from the Founding-era. Instead, there were crucial pivot moments or periods of time that 
served as catalysts for non-incremental change – I attempt to lay out some of these points 
in the section entitled “Transition to Liberal Individualism.” Having asserted these key 
moments, the liberal individualist society that pervades the modern paradigm now has its 
roots, and we can better understand the emergence of modern values such as individual 
rights and protections.  
To elucidate the nature of this paradigm change, consider the example of a pious 
man who converts religions from Islam to Buddhism. He likely did not wake up one 
morning and decide to become a Buddhist, the process was presumably long, with several 
crucial moments that helped shape the nature of his faith. By the end of his life, he fully 
embraced the Buddhist lifestyle, and his personal values and virtues substantially differed 
from his life prior to his conversion. We should not read experiences from his earlier life 
behind a Buddhist lens, given that his Buddhist conversion did not take shape until 
significantly later in his life. While there may have been latent strands of Buddhist 
philosophy engrained within his lifestyle, their importance is minimized in the face of the 
dominance of Islam on his life. We can only interpret his “intentions” and the “meaning 
of his actions” from his early life within the perspective of Islam, and similarly, his 
intentions and actions post-conversion ought to be seen within the context of Buddhism. 
We can trace the trajectory of the American cultural paradigm analogously to the 
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converted man.5 The Founding-era United States was largely dominated by a civic 
republican society, and while there existed elements of liberal individualism within this 
time period, those elements were relatively insignificant in comparison to the role of the 
public and public good. Modern society reflects a development of those liberal elements, 
while the remnants of civic republicanism have all but dissolved. Just as we must not 
interpret actions during the pious man’s period as a Muslim devotee behind a Buddhist 
lens, it is dangerous to read modern, liberal values of individual rights into a paradigm 
which championed civic republicanism. The values, events, and writings of the 
Founding-era are embedded within civic republicanism, and originalists’ attempt to 
divorce them within the context of Second Amendment discourse is irresponsible, 
ideologically-driven interpretation.  
Given the severe discontinuity between Founding-era and modern cultural 
paradigms, a true originalist, acknowledging the arguments developed in this thesis, 
would maintain that we must repeal the Second Amendment. It is impossible to reconcile 
these two paradigms, as we cannot abstract any conceptions regarding guns or societal 
norms into the modern paradigm while staying loyal to originalism. Regardless of which 
iteration of originalism one subscribes to, originalism’s commitments to history remain 
steadfast. The alternative would be fostering a complete change in society, to a 
reintroduction of militias and attempting to recreate their civic, social role. This is 
obviously far-fetched, as it would be virtually impossible to even imagine (let alone 
                                                        
5 The difficulty with this analogy is that a religious conversion culminates, or may 
culminate, in one particular moment wherein an individual has formally adopted a new 
faith. Though the civic republican-liberal individualist paradigm lacks this singular 
moment, I still see the analogy to be instructive insofar as it demonstrates the pitfalls of 
misinterpretation.  
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implement) a modern-day civic republican society in the vein of the Founding Era. But 
even in this instance, we are still left with the ‘expiration’ of original meaning. The 
nature of guns and military weapons have evolved to such an extent that we could not 
derive any sort of practical instruction from the Founders. Repealing the Amendment 
would not necessarily issue a ban on guns, rather it would assert that there cannot be an 
originalist Constitutional protection for the right to bear arms; instead, the regulation of 
arms would be completely yielded to the legislative branch.  
An obvious question follows this realization – what are the implications of a 
paradigm shift to other Amendments? It varies, depending on Amendment. More 
research specifically focusing on early American history will help in illuminating each 
respective Amendment’s association with its paradigm. The Second Amendment is 
particularly peculiar in this sense, given its connection to the Founding-era society. It is a 
direct product of the civic republican paradigm and as a result, suffers immeasurably 
from the transition to liberal individualism. Other Amendments are not necessarily as 
linked to civic republicanism, and thus, originalist interpretation may not be as harmful. 
Consider the Eighth Amendment as an example. A cursory reading of the Amendment 
indicates that protection against cruel and unusual punishment appears to be out of a 
basic respect for humanity and right to life. There is most certainly more context and 
reasoning that went into the Amendment’s ratification, but assuming the original intent of 
the Framers (and thus an Old Originalist perspective) was to protect the individual right 
exclusively, then the Amendment can withhold the transition to the liberal individualist 
paradigm. We can reasonably deduce how cruel and unusual punishment will translate in 
modern society – the protection of the Amendment was not restricted to Founding-era 
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punishments, such as flogging or tarring and feathering. In Heller’s majority opinion, 
Scalia attempts to draw on a similar sentiment: 
Some have made the argument, bordering on the frivolous, that only those arms in 
existence in the 18th century are protected by the Second Amendment. We do not 
interpret constitutional rights that way. Just as the First Amendment protects modern 
forms of communications, e.g., Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U. S. 844, 
849 (1997), and the Fourth Amendment applies to modern forms of search, e.g., Kyllo v. 
United States, 533 U. S. 27, 35–36 (2001) , the Second Amendment extends, prima facie, 
to all instruments that constitute bearable arms, even those that were not in existence at 
the time of the founding (District of Columbia v. Heller, 2008). 
 
Unfortunately, Scalia is direly mistaken with this line of reasoning. Had gun culture 
remained unchanged from the Founding era, Scalia’s ideas would be valid. But in reality, 
the mass proliferation in guns (especially the concealable handgun), technological 
advances of military weapon, eradication of militias, as well as the cultural context in 
which guns and their use has meaning, have altered the context of bearable arms in 
society. I would point to Jack Rakove’s passage on page 38 as an articulation of the 
danger in assuming uniform contexts between time periods, especially regarding the 
Second Amendment. 
 In conclusion, the notion of the paradigm shift has apparently been overlooked by 
constitutional law scholarship. This project describes the radical discontinuity across the 
civic republican and liberal individual paradigms, subverting the traditional grounding for 
Second Amendment discourse. I hope to have demonstrated the importance of 
appreciating the role that cultural paradigms must play in constitutional interpretation.  
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